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ABSTRACT 
Recent reexaminations of the principles of tort liability have entertained two possible 
rationales for the fault principle, one "moral" and the other economic. Neither is satisfactory. 
I propose here a third rationale and show how it suffices to refute at least some of the 
challenges to the negligence system. The character of this rationale is causal, and the central 
thesis of this paper is that in as much as the tort system should aim to place the costs of 
accidents on the source of those accidents, then we have not yet found an acceptable 
alternative to the negligence system. This thesis is defended and developed through a 
reexamination of some recent theories of strict liability and reflection on some of what has 
been said about the role of causation in torts. A backdrop to the entire discussion is the 
question of how one might best ensure that potential defendants will be able to predict with 
reasonable certainty which courses of action will make them liable, should damages ensue. 

JUSTICE AND PREDICTABILITY IN TORTS 
Randall Curren 
Recent reexaminations of the principles of tort liability have entertained two possible 
rationales for the fault principle, one "moral" and the other economic. The former was given 
its classic formulation by Oliver Wendell Holmes in The Common Law and exerted its greatest 
influence during the golden age of negligence law, while the latter is the recent invention of 
Richard Posner. 1 Both of these rationales have been attacked, and indeed neither is 
satisfactory. There is a third rationale, however, which may well be historically prior to both 
of these, which captures, I believe, what is correct in the Holmesian view, and which suffices 
to repulse at least some of the challenges to the negligence system. The character of this 
rationale is neither moral, nor economic, but rather causal. The central thesis of this paper 
will be that in as much as the tort system should aim to place the costs of accidents on the 
source of those accidents, then we have not yet found an acceptable alternative to the 
negligence system. This thesis will be defended and developed through a reexamination of 
some recent theories of strict liability and reflection on some of what has been said about the 
role of causation in torts. A backdrop to the entire discussion will be the question of how 
one might best ensure that potential defendants will be able to predict with reasonable 
certainty which courses of action will make them liable, should damages ensue. 
There is a dilemma concerning justice and rules of law which has it that legal rules can 
be either rigid or flexible in their application, but on either alternative their application leads 
inevitably to unjust results in at least some cases. On the one hand, a rule rigidly applied 
may yield unjust results when novel, unexpected situations arise. On the other hand, greater 
scope for judicial discretion makes the outcomes of judicial reasoning less predictable, and 
thus makes it less reasonable to expect defendants to have known what the legal consequences 
of their conduct would be. The legitimacy of imposing liability is thereby put in question, 
since defendants will not have been given fair warning of the legal consequences of their 
conduct. 
The former variety of injustice was the concern of the early Realists, the so-called 
"sociological jurisprudes,,,2 who, contrasting tort principles which had been formulated in the 
nineteenth century with the social conditions of their own time, denounced "mechanical 
jurisprudence.,,3 Seeking to make jurisprudence scientific, the architects of classical 
negligence theory had formulated a system of universal principles, and by the early twentieth 
century those principles had shown signs of needing reformulation, at least, if serious in-
equities were to be avoided. Industrialization had brought new kinds of cases before courts, 
and a new background of social problems to which tort actions were relevant. In effect, 
courts came to be presented much of the time with situations of fact not apprehended by the 
lawmakers who had "drafted" the law. What was not forseen was, (1) that the rise of 
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corporate enterprise would make it implausible in many cases to treat plaintiff and defendant 
as standing on an equal footing with respect to protecting themselves from injury, and (2) 
that adherence to some of the specific doctrines of classical negligence theory would 
exacerbate social problems associated with increasing disparities of wealth and power, by 
limiting recovery for injuries in the workplace and from defective products. The principle 
of assumption of risk, for instance, made it impossible for an employee to recover for 
injuries owing to a hazard in his workplace that he knew about. The idea was that if 
someone knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to a hazardous condition created by 
someone else, then he implicitly took it upon himself to bear the costs of any injuries arising 
from that condition. But this involves an exercise in bad faith when applied to the workplace, 
since leaving a job in order to escape a hazardous condition is, and was, not a live option for 
many people. It would be fair to say that they expose themselves to those hazards 
unwillingly, and yet the principle was applied in such a way that recovery for most injuries 
in the workplace was impossible.4 
Suggestions for correcting this state of affairs ranged from the (early Realist) modest 
proposal that principles be modified in light of new social realities, to the (late "radical" 
Realist) position that rules of substance didn't and couldn't play the role in judicial decision 
that the architects of negligence had assumed.5 This radical version of Realism, however, 
falls victim to the other side of our dilemma. I will comment briefly on just why this is so in 
order to locate more specifically the problem set for contemporary tort theorists by the 
history of attempts to confront this dilemma. In light of this background I will then assess 
some recent arguments for systems of strict liability which, on the face of it, would remedy 
this problem appreciably. 
If any aspect of classical negligence theory made radical Realism seem plausible it was 
the embarrassing proliferation of unsatisfactory casual formulas from which it suffered.6 
This lack of consensus, and the failure of those formulas to provide clear guidance, suggested 
that the task of developing a formula for capturing proximate causation might be ill-
conceived. That, notoriously, was just what Leon Green argued in Rationale of Proximate 
Cause? His widely acclaimed solution was to simplify the causal question in torts by 
restricting it solely to matters of fact, and to conceive of the balance of what had pertained 
to proximate causation as questions concerning the scope of the defendant's duties to the 
plaintiff. This marked the end of an era in which defendants were held to owe, and should 
have understood that they owed, a general duty of care to everyone. Obligations were 
henceforth to be relative to particular individuals and particular kinds of injuries, and were 
to be identified by courts through a process of "interest-balancing." This focus on balancing 
interests was consistent with Green's conception of the tort system as sharing with other 
agencies of government the function of maintaining "a working adjustment between the 
activities of men."S 
The upshot of this revamping of theory has been summarized recently by G. Edward 
White:9 
Relational negligence theory introduced questions of "interest balancing," in-
viting judges to compare the magnitude of the risks to which a plaintiff was 
exposed, and the social worth of the class of persons a plaintiff represented, with the 
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social utility of a defendant's conduct. In the process ... the capacity of the 
negligence principle to be predictably applied was lost, because a general heirarchy 
of social "interests" could not be invariably agreed upon by the judges, and thus even 
a routinized judicial balancing of interests would not produce predictable results. 
The loss of predictability, I must emphasize, is specifically with respect to the determination 
of the scope of the defendant's duties, and is surely even more intractable than White 
suggests, given the problems involved in "identifying, comparing and weighting interests."IO 
Is all tort law ex post facto, then, under relational negligence theory? Green thought so 
and did not hide his acceptance of this apparent consequence of his views. I I His gesture 
notwithstanding, there can be no accepting such a position, and we must ask what viable 
alternative to it there might be. Let us note first that Ronald Dworkin advanced a line of 
reasoning some years ago, which offers some prospect for accepting many aspects of Green's 
views while denying that tort law is ex post facto. 12 Dworkin distinguished "weak" 
discretion, where judgment is exercised but no law created, from "strong", ex post facto law-
creating discretion, and maintained that only the latter poses a problem for justice. He also 
held that, in general, policies have just as much claim to being law as rules do. Granted this, 
it could then be argued that, in adhering to a policy of balancing interests, only "weak" 
discretion would be exercised and no law created ex post facto. The law, in the form of 
rules of procedure, would have been in effect all along. 
This is little help, however, for what is objectionable about ex post facto law-making, 
when it is objectionable, is that fair warning is not given. As we have seen, there is no fair 
warning of, and no predicting, what the defendant's duties will be held to be under the 
relational negligence approach, and so whether there is ex post facto law-making or not is 
inconsequential. The defendant cannot have been expected to know the identity of his or her 
duties before the fact, the law has not made them antecedently knowable, and so the rule 
that ignorance of the law will not be admitted as an excuse cannot be legitmately invoked. 
Where liability is assigned on the basis of a duty whose identity could not have been known 
by the defendant prior to bringing about the injuries for which remedy is sought, standard 
justifications fail and justice is not served. Broad discretion poses a larger problem for 
justice than Dworkin suggested, therefore, and we must conclude that the radical Realists 
merely traded one form of injustice for another in trying to eliminate the injustices 
associated with classical negligence doctrines. If classical negligence doctrines produced 
injustice when applied to novel cases, the relational negligence approach entailed a more 
global variety of injustice. 
To maintain that we face here a genuine dilemma is not to suggest, however, that the 
sum total of injustice is invariable and cannot be reduced. For the trade-off it involves only 
pertains to that class of exceptional cases in which a regimented (and therefore presumably 
predictable) application of the law would be intuitively unjust,13 and there is no a priori 
determinable limit to how small that class can be made. The best strategy, implicit in the 
notion of keeping principles in step with "conditions of society today," is evidently to make 
that class as small as possible. By contrast, the generalized lack of predictability connected 
with the indeterminacies of "interest-balancing" seems clearly gratuitous, and it is sobering to 
reflect that the compromises out of which post-Realist "consensus" thought emerged produced 
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not so much an enhancement of predictability as a greater appearance of order and 
predictability. 14 
An element of this consensus has been the preservation of the distinction between 
proximate cause and cause in fact, it being assumed by and large that the latter (the factual 
element in causation) is exhausted by the "but for" relation. Given the role that policy has 
played in bridging the gap between these two causal notions, it is plain that the "but for" 
analysis is a sensible point of attack for those wishing to advance the cause of order and 
predictability. To the extent that a new analysis would enhance the role of a factual 
determination of causality, there would to that extent be less that could be decided through 
policies allowing broad discretion. H. L. A. Hart and A. M. Honore saw this, and the point 
of their classic, Causation in The Law,I5 was to show that there is a common notion of 
causality more substantial than the "but for" relation, which accounts in large measure for 
how courts have resolved questions of causality. On a proper understanding of causality, 
they argued, the gap between cause in fact and proximate cause in which the wedge of policy 
may be driven is smaller than Green and most tort theorists since him have supposed. 
Moreover, this remains a sound strategy even if, as some have argued,I6 the idea of a single 
general duty of care has reemerged, and policy assumed a more limited role, in recent years. 
But Hart and Honore's unusually careful analysis has made little difference to the direction 
of torts scholarship, for the specific rules they formulated for applying that analysis to 
particular cases were dismissed as prohibitively complex, especially in the context of jury 
instruction. I7 
More recently, Guido Calabresi has advocated an approach which would apparently make 
determinations of liability significantly simpler and more predictable through the adoption of 
a strict liability standard. IS Instead of grappling with the complexities of fault, courts 
would simply determine "which of the parties to the accident is in the best position to make 
the cost-benefit analysis between accident costs and accident avoidance costs and to act on that 
decision once it is made.,,19 Categories of "cheap cost-avoiders" (i.e., enterprises which 
could easily assess and reduce the risks posed by their products or activities) could be 
identified by courts or legislatures in advance of litigation, thereby providing guidance and 
giving fair warning to potential litigants. Calabresi and Hirschoff advance this as a test of 
strict liability, arguing that the trend towards strict liability is explained by its greater 
efficiency in minimizing the combined costs of accidents and measures intended to prevent 
accidents, and its greater ease of (correct) application compared with complicated and flexible 
fault-based tests.20 This market approach to reducing primary accident costs is qualified in 
a way calculated to satisfy the goal of compensation ("secondary cost avoidance goals"),21 
and would be "buttressed by an array of non-insurable fines, penalties, and taxes assessed so 
as to deter or limit further those particular acts and activities we collectively decided to 
punish or deter beyond what the market could accomplish" (making for a mixed approach). 
Reduction of the immediate costs of accidents ("primary accident costs") through the 
market or "general deterrence" approach is to be achieved through both "creat[ing] incentives 
to engage in safer activities," and "encourag[ing] us to make activities safer.,,22 And these 
incentives are to be created, using the strict liability test, through "the placing of losses on 
those activities that, in some undefined sense, engender them.,,23 As is the case in other 
economic theories, the sense of "engender" is, if not causal, put forward as a substitute for 
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causal notions.24 In effect, the prominent role of breach of duty in establishing proximate 
causation is acknowledged, and an economic test provided for determining who has what 
duties. But identifying the duty and establishing a breach of it are two different things, and 
it is noteworthy that the latter has no counterpart in Calabresi's scheme. This in itself is 
some reason to think that he has not provided an adequate analysis of, or replacement for, 
the idea of proximate causation. 
On Calabresi's approach the only decision to be made concerns who was in the best 
position to make and act on a relevant cost-benefit analysis. The test "does not require that a 
governmental institution make a cost-benefit analysis,,,25 a feature of it which makes for 
easier and surer application than the Learned Hand test,26 and other tests of fault, but which 
also underscores the irrelevance on this approach of what the parties involved actually did. 
No cost-benefit analysis will be made pursuant to determining liability, and evidently no 
distinctions made between those cheaper cost-avoiders who invested optimally in accident 
prevention measures, and those who didn't.27 Of course, what is reasonable, indeed clever, 
in this approach is that it does seem to create an incentive for every enterprise to invest 
optimally in accident prevention measures (since prevention will reduce the number of 
accidents, and so will reduce the sum cost of accidents to be borne by the enterprise), and it 
does this without creating, as the fault standard does, incentives for litigants to misrepresent 
the state of their knowledge. But plainly there are many accidents that occur despite optimal 
investment in preventive measures, and where it would be absurd to claim that the party who 
had made those investments engendered the accident, whether or not on some test that party 
could be counted the cheapest cost-avoider. The relevant cases include ones in which the 
cheapest cost-avoider is not alone in engaging in relevantly risky activities and makes a 
greater effort than the others to prevent accidents, and also cases in which no relevantly risky 
activities are engaged in knowingly or negligently by anyone. This is not to say that no 
justification for imposing liability could be given to a defendant who is involved in an 
accident despite his investing adequately in preventive measures, but it does imply that 
Calabresi has not provided a suitable justification, inasmuch as the test he offers is at 
variance with his intention to construct a "general deterrence" approach that places "losses on 
those activities that ... engender them." 
Into the first category fall cases in which the cheapest cost-avoider made optimal 
investments, but a costlier cost-avoider, the plaintiff let us say, did not take reasonable 
precautions. In many such cases there is good reason to say that the negligent costlier cost-
avoider has caused the injuries, and not the careful cheaper cost-avoider. It is easier and 
cheaper, for instance, for the firm that designs and markets a complicated electrical device 
for home use to assess and reduce the risks involved in using that device, than it is is for 
consumers to do so; the firm is the cheaper cost-avoider of the two. And yet, if a consumer 
is injured through his own gross contributory negligence in the use of some such device, and 
there is no argument that the firm has failed to take appropriate safety measures, then the 
reasonable causal diagnosis would seem to be that the consumer has caused his own injuries. 
This recognition that contributory negligence can provide a basis, when there is no fault on 
the defendant's part, for regarding the injured party as having caused (or engendered) his 
own injuries, is at least as old as the Athenian law of the fifth century.28 In such cases as 
these, at least, Calabresi's test would not place the losses on the party who had engendered 
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them. This being the case, it is apparent that an adequate test, one that could well seve the 
needs of the general deterrence approach, would be considerably more complex. 
Calabresi speaks, moreover, of losses being placed on the activities that engender them, 
but it is agents, and not activities, of course, that must bear losses, and the appropriate agents 
cannot be identified simply by reference to the general categories of activities they are 
engaged in. We have just seen one reason why this is so. But neither, it must be observed, 
can the factors that engender injuries be restricted to activities, for this too implies an 
unrealistic degree of control by agents over what they do. Many injuries must surely arise 
through agents running risks that they are not aware of running and have no reason to think 
they are running; not only do the injuries arise accidentally, but the very fact that the agent's 
conduct displays a relevantly risky character arises accidentally (i.e., through some factor 
external and unknown to the agent). In some cases no one will have been in any position to 
do a relevant cost-benefit analysis (i.e., one embracing the kind of cost involved in the 
accident), and so there can be no cheapest "cost-avoider." There won't be any "cost-avoider." 
Economic goals and the economic analysis of causation become irrelevant here in this zone 
beyond the effective range of incentives to reduce costs, but the need to place accident losses 
somewhere remains. Are they to be shifted or not? If so, to whom? Causal inquiries into 
the factors responsible for the accidents also continue to be relevant, though their usefulness 
will be restricted to future prevention, including perhaps the identification of new categories 
of accidents and cost-avoiders. This is another reason then, why diagnostic and prescriptive 
machinery beyond what Calabresi makes available will be required to allocate losses and 
conduct causal inquests, and this will not merely duplicate what I have already argued will be 
needed. 
But even this will not be enough, for further complications arise when circumstances are 
such as to render the cheapest cost-avoider's advantage in prevention unusable. Calabresi 
recognizes this in insisting that "the cheapest cost-avoider must be able to make the required 
analysis and act upon it,,,29 and he admits, apropos of this, that "a fair degree of case by case 
analysis is worthwhile.,,30 Given this acknowledged role for ability or the absence of ability, 
a categorically costlier cost-avoider may turn out to be a cheaper cost-avoider in the 
circumstances. Consider nighttime waterway collisions, for instance. The cheapest cost-
avoider for an accident involving a ship colliding with a shoreline structure at a river bend is 
almost certainly the owner of the structure, who can easily determine that lights should be 
installed, maintained, and lit at night. Let us suppose that the owner of a waterfront 
warehouse has in fact invested optimally in lighting, but that these measures come to be 
thwarted through no fault of his own for a brief but critical span of time. A power outage 
occurs, for instance, during a freak snow storm, which also reduces visibility. The night 
watchman and the owner, who could make his way to the scene only slowly given road 
conditions, are not equipped and are in no position to do anything further for the moment. 
The status of cheapest cost-avoider may be said to shift then to the captain, pilot, or owner 
of the ship already approaching the darkened bend in the river, unless it is judged that port 
authorities, for instance, were in the best position to provide in advance for such a situation. 
Once again, however, this choice of a cheapest cost-avoider does not settle the causal 
questions that present themselves as relevant. 
The tidy picture of an uncluttered appeal to previously identified and ranked categories 
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of cost-avoiders is certainly too simple, given these considerations, and we must now ask just 
how cumbersome and subject to misapplication Calabresi's approach would become when 
modified appropriately. We must ask this, recall, because: our overarching interest here is in 
the potential Calabresi's recommendations have for regimenting the basis of tort decisions in 
a way that will make them more predictable. 
The answer to this question, I think, is that the reconstructed test could scarcely be 
simpler or more certain in application than the fault system. Why this is so is clear. The 
first kind of case cited here (which combines plaintiff's negligence with the defendant's own 
exercise of due care) shows that the tactic of merely deciding who should make the cost-
benefit analysis will not suffice. It will be necessary to carry out some such analyses in 
disposing of cases, and it is preferable that these analyses should better reflect what is 
socially valuable than purely economic analyses do. The other considerations I have adduced 
show that factors like unforseeability and inability, which have the status of excuses within 
the negligence system, must be considered. So something akin to, if not identical with, the 
negligence system's reasonable man standard and system of excuses must be used. This 
argument can be laid out more perspicuously, however, as follows. Calabresi's approach, like 
other systems of strict liability, is designed to place the costs of accidents on those who have 
engendered or caused them, but without making the further requirement that these costs will 
be transferred only when fault is present. The assumption is that the unwieldly machinery of 
the fault system can be eliminated, thereby, making for a more cheaply, simply, and 
predictably administered tort system. This strategy fails, however, because though the casual 
and fault conditions for liability under the fault system are logically distinct, those conditions 
often cannot be satisfied independently of one another. That is, it is often impossible to 
determine whether the causal requirement is satisfied without already knowing whether or not 
the requirement of fault is satisfied. 
In determining whether contributory negligence is present, for instance, it is clear that a 
judgment as to whether the plaintiff has contributed causally to her own injuries hangs 
directly, though not solely, on whether she was negligent. It is less obvious, perhaps, that the 
availability or unavailability of a good excuse can make a decisive difference to whether an 
agent has caused, or been merely a background condition in the genesis of, an event or state 
of affairs. Unobvious as it might be, however, the idea that faultlessness entails that the 
harm has a source outside the agent has had some influence in the law, and not only in 
Athenian law. In an opinion of the late nineteenth century~ that reflected the views of 
Holmes, for instance, it was argued, by one Judge Charles Doe that imposing liability without 
a showing of fault was tantamount to maintaining that "everyone is liable for all damage done 
by superior force overpowering him, and using him or his property as an instrument of 
violence.,,31 It is worth reexamining this claim, especially now when the momentum behind 
strict liability has been growing for some time. The character of the negligence standard, so 
well understood by Aristotle, for instance,32 does not seem to be well understood now, if the 
arguments of the strict liability theorists are any indication. This is a circumstance we would 
to well to remedy, and it will be instructive along the way to consider another recent attempt 
to produce a streamlined reformulation of tort principles through eliminating determinations 
of fault. 
Richard Epstein, like Calabresi, has argued for the universalization of strict liability, 33 
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though by contrast with the economic basis for Calabresi's argument, he characterizes his own 
case for it as based on principles of corrective justice. The notion of a "causal paradigm", 
derived from Hart and Honore but much simpler in application than their rules, also plays a 
central role in Epstein's account. Thus Epstein seems to have derived inspiration from both 
Calabresi, and Hart and Honore, and to have aimed to produce an approach that would 
deliver the regimentation and economies of decision procedure promised by both, while 
avoiding the charge of moral bankruptcy often levelled against the economic theories. Given 
this orientation, it is not surprising that the theory has been praised for according central 
positions to both justice and certainty.34 Unfortunately, however, it suffers from serious 
defects which seem to have gone undiagnosed in the literature, despite the promising leads 
provided by John Borgo and Jules Coleman.35 
Epstein conceives of tort law as "a system of corrective justice appropriate for the redress 
of private harms,,,36 by contrast with conceptions of torts as an instrument of public policy. 
As a system of corrective justice it rests, he maintains, on common notions of moral 
responsibility for harm. He offers two fundamental principles that are meant to capture these 
shared notions of responsibility. The first of these, which I'll call the "Unfair Gain Principle," 
holds that it is not "fair to let one party gain an advantage at the expense of another.,,37 
Thus he conceives of torts as a system of corrective justice designed to simultaneously 
eliminate wrongful gains and wrongful losses by compelling compensation. 
A second fundamental principle he appeals to, which I'll call the "Source of Harm 
Principle," holds that when defendant and plaintiff face each other in court, "proof of the 
nonreciprocal source of the harm is sufficient to upset the balance where one person must 
win and the other must lose.,,38 Another way to put this is to say that D's having caused 
harm to P constitutes prima facie grounds for shifting the cost of P's injuries to D. This 
principle is grounded he says in the "deep sense of common law morality that one who hurts 
another should compensate him,,,39 and it is to be understood as a repudiation of the notion 
that a showing of fault is required to overcome the initial presumption in favor of letting the 
costs of injuries lie where they fall. 
On the basis of this Source of Harm Principle Epstein holds that all a plaintiff, P, must 
do to make out a prima facie case against a defendant, D, is show that D caused P's injuries. 
The defenses and pleas that may be admitted subsequently are, in accordance with the Unfair 
Gain Principle, "designed to eliminate benefits gained at the plaintiff's expense.,,40 A 
number of defenses belonging to the negligence system are excluded in this way, thereby 
providing Epstein with an argument for imposing a strict standard of liability in all tort 
cases. The argument, in effect, is that people gain at the expense of others in the course of 
causing injuries to them, and so they should compensate them, even when the defenses they 
offer show that they were not at fault. Consequently, a just standard of liability is one that 
does not recognize such defenses or otherwise make liability depend on fault. This could 
hardly be more sharply at odds with the position of Doe's .cited above. On his view one 
could not turn out to have caused injuries unless one was at fault, whereas on Epstein's view 
the absence of fault could never overturn a judgment that one had caused someone else's 
injuries. 
Epstein's central argument against making liability dependant on fault, his answer in 
effect to Doe, is presented persuasively in examining Vincent v. Lake Erie Transport Co.41 , 
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which he recounts as follows:42 
During a violent storm, defendant ordered his men to continue to make the ship fast 
to the dock during the course of the storm in order to protect it from the elements. 
The wind and waves repeatedly drove it into the dock, damaging it to the extent of 
$500 .... Moreover, it was accepted without question that the conduct of the 
defendant was reasonable in that there was no possible course of action open to the 
captain of the ship that would have enabled him to reduce the aggregate damage 
suffered by the ship and the dock. On these facts the court concluded that the 
defendant had to pay the plaintiff for the $500 damage. 
This case is well chosen for Epstein's purposes, for clearly the defendant has caused the 
damage to the plaintiff's dock through intentionally adopting a policy whose results, 
including the damage to the dock, he anticipates and accepts. His choice was constrained; 
nevertheless he could have adopted another policy which would have left the dock unharmed. 
Moreover, the kind of direct tradeoff between plaintiff's and defendant's interests, which 
must be present for the Unfair Gain Principle to apply, is at work here. 
Epstein errs, however, in taking Vincent to be a suitable model for all accidents. In this 
he follows the lead of Coase, whose economic analysis he explicitly endorses,43 and whom he 
quotes at length in arguing for his own view of causality:44 
The question is commonly thought of as one in which A inflicts harm on B and what 
has to be decided is: how should we restrain A? ; But this is wrong. We are dealing 
with a problem of a reciprocal nature. To avoid the harm to B would inflict harm 
on A. The real question that has to be decided is: should A be allowed to harm B or 
should B be allowed to harm A? The problem is to avoid the more serious harm. 
The illustrations Coase provides are all consistent with the central claim here that a harm to 
one party can only be prevented at the expense of another: the damage of crops by the cattle 
on the adjoining property that inevitably stray; the disruption of a doctor's practice by the 
sounds of the confectioner's machinery next door; the killing of fish by pollution which 
compels us to weigh the value of the fish against "the value of the product which the 
contamination of the stream makes possible.,,45 In these cases costs arise through the 
ongoing, repetitive practices of business enterprises whose behavior is already efficiently 
managed with respect to actual costs, including, under some subjective weighting, those of 
harms of the kind at issue. Routine harms such as these occur with the frequency they do 
because cost-benefit analyses based on some estimation of their importance have been made 
and acted on. They occur, that is, because some agent, some economic entity, has chosen to 
run the risk of their occurring. To run a lesser risk would involve expense: either investing 
more in preventive measures (anti-pollution devices, e.g.) or ceasing to engage in the 
presumably profitable activity which creates the risks in the first place. 
One aspect of this economic analysis, the notion that there are always direct tradeoffs of 
costs between the parties to an accident, underlies Epstein's assumption that his Unfair Gain 
Principle may be applied without restriction to the field of torts. Since it would always cost 
10 
the defendant something to prevent the occurrence of the harm, then apparently it is always 
the case that he or she gained something at the other's expense in not doing so. 
The farther from the realm of routine business practices we direct our attention, 
however, the more obvious it becomes that not all accidents fall within the scope of the plans 
laid by potential defendants. There really are accidents that are not only unforeseen, but also 
unforseeable in the circumstances. The cases that Coase marshals are ones in which the 
potential for appealing to excuses has run out through sheer force of repetition; increasing 
familiarity with how the harms come about rules out appeals to unforseeability, while the 
availability of time and resources with which to take corrective action rules out appeals to 
inability or lack of opportunity. The risks being taken come increasingly to be ones 
intentionally taken. By contrast, the conduct of individuals is necessarily more disparate and, 
in a sense, random than that of businesses, which fact alone suggests that it will turn out to 
be excusable more often. We simply cannot avoid running risks of which we are unaware, 
and sometimes injuries will result from these risks. In these cases there is no reason at all to 
think that the one who has run the risk has gained or saved anything thereby. The running 
of that risk will have played no role at all in any maximizing strategy. So in this event a loss 
will have been suffered without any correlative gain.46 
It should be clear now that while the Unfair Gain Principle can be applied in cases 
where, as in Vincent, a self -serving but adequate justification for the defendant's action (the 
defense of "private necessity") is available,47 it cannot be invoked in those cases where other 
standard excuses are available. Consequently, it cannot provide Epstein with an argument for 
not admitting these excuses as effective defenses. I will turn now to his account of causation 
in order to show that a large class of excuses must be admitted, so long as the basis for 
assigning liability is to be the defendant's having caused injuries. 
Epstein builds his account of causation on the idea of a "causal paradigm," a strategy 
inspired perhaps by the following passage from Hart and Honore:48 
... we cause one thing to move by striking it with another, glass to break by 
throwing stones, injuries by blows, things to get hot by putting them on fires. Here 
the notions of cause and effect come together with the notion of means to ends . ... 
Cases of this exceedingly simple type are not only those where the expressions cause 
and effect have their most obvious application; they are also paradigms for the under-
standing of the causal language used in very different types of cases .... 
Before considering Epstein's use of this, I would like to draw attention to the role of 
purpose and intention in these paradigmatic cases of causation, the status of bodily 
movements and primary changes (e.g. the movement of the stone) as means for bringing 
about a desired result (e.g. the breaking of the glass). The clearest cases in which 
interventions in courses of events take place are ones in which these intentions "to bring about 
what in fact happens, and in the manner in which it happens," are present.49 More broadly, 
Hart and Honore observe that in distinguishing between "the" cause of an event and mere 
background conditions for its occurrence, we look for an abnormal element in the sequence 
of events leading up to the one to be accounted for. In the normal case accidents do not 
occur, so in the abnormal case where they do we try to determine what else is different on 
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the assumption that something must have been different for the accident to have occurred. 
We take that something to be what explains the occurrence of the accident. The other factors, 
they say, "are, of course, just those which are present alike in both the case where such 
accidents occur and in the normal cases where they do not; and it is this consideration that 
leads ... to reject[ing] them as the cause of the accident, even though it is true that without 
them the accident would not have occurred.,,50 
Now it turns out that the causal paradigms Epstein offers as capturing ordinary causal 
language are on a par with the paradigms Hart and Honore cite only given the same faulty 
assumptions that made it appear that his Unfair Gain Principle had universal application. 
The four paradigms he offers are the "application of force to a person or thing,,,51 as in 
hitting; frightening someone; compelling someone to do something; creating a dangerous 
condition that results in harm. To the outward forms of behavior belonging to these 
paradigms Epstein adds what he calls the "act requirement," the condition that volition be 
present, "to distinguish between 'I raised my arm,' and 'my arm went up.,,,52 In effect he 
requires that some intention lie behind the behavior, but unlike Hart and Honore he doesn't 
care what the intention is. The reason for this indifference, I take it, is that given the 
economic model's assumption of practical omniscience, all risks taken would be regarded as 
taken intentionally and pursuant to whatever aims the agent is intentionally pursuing, and so 
any injuries that occur when the agent's behavior fits one of the four paradigms would 
necessarily fall within the scope of risks intentionally run. This would be adequate grounds 
for seeing the agent as having intervened in the normal course of events so as to bring about 
the injuries. In Hart and Honore's paradigmatic cases the intervention is intentional (i.e., it 
aims to bring about the result in question), whereas here it is reckless; the risks are run 
intentionally, but no intention to bring about the injuries is present. 
The possibility of the still weaker form of intervention, that which occurs when risks are 
run not intentionally, but through culpable ignorance or inability, does not even arise given 
the economic assumptions. So if those assumptions were true, strict liability would not be so 
very strict. Since they are not true, Epstein's form of strict liability must be too strict, that 
is to say, too permissive in who it assigns liability to; it shares this defect with Calabresi's 
version of strict liability, and is defective for essentially the same reasons that Calabresi's is. 
If the basic conception of causation that Hart and Honore advance, and Epstein endorses,53 
is correct, then one must have run the relevant risk at least negligently, if not intentionally, 
for one to have been the cause of the injuries that ensue, 'tunless the injuries can be traced to 
an abnormal feature of one other than defective preferences or intentions. That is, unless one 
has run the risk knowingly and as part of some policy, then one can only be counted as 
having been the source and cause the injuries if one fails to count as having acted reasonably 
under the reasonable man standard. This is so because the "reasonable man" conforms not 
only to moral and legal norms, but also to common objective standards of skill, knowledge, 
intelligence, sanity, and so on.54 So when conduct is judged unreasonable under this 
standard, it will have arisen through the abnormality of some feature of the agent, and not 
necessarily through what we might call the agent's will. But this is enough to confer causal 
status on the agent, given Hart and Honore's conception of causality. On the other hand, 
when conduct is reasonable under this test and an excuse available -- when one comes to run 
a risk through innocent ignorance of the circumstances, for instance -- a better candidate for 
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causal status will often be the external source of the ignorance (e.g., the absence of a warning 
label) or the unsuspected factor that lends danger to an action that would ordinarily be 
innocuous (e.g., the cyanide in the apparently tamper-proof pain remedy offered to one's 
guest). So we may fairly characterize the apparatus of the negligence system, the reasonable 
man standard and system of excuses, as designed to determine whether given injuries have 
their source in any fault in the agent; this is a test of the agent's status as the source and 
cause of the injuries, and not as morally responsible for them, despite what the word "fault" 
might suggest. Once again, however, it must be added that acting unreasonably, on this test, 
is not necessary to establishing causal responsibility for injuries, if there is an intentional, if 
reasonable, adoption of a policy known to bring about such injuries. 
We can see now that there is a lot of truth in the view that imposing liability without 
fault would be like imposing it for "damage done by superior force over-powering" the 
defendant, except that the force will often "outsmart" rather than overpower, and it may be 
superior only in the sense that in the cirsumstances the agent has no opportunity to overcome 
it. The point, at root, is that the force or factor most saliently responsible for the injuries 
will be something other than the agent; the agent will not have been the source and cause of 
the injuries (that which engendered the injuries, to use Calabresi's expression). What is 
mistaken in Doe's view is that he overlooks the fact that (as in Vincent) an agent can cause 
injuries through intentionally running a risk, even when not negligent on the whole. Given 
what is right in Doe's view, we can conclude that it is not the case, as often thought,55 that a 
notion of fairness, as distinct from the requirement that the defendant have caused the 
plaintiff's injuries, is needed to defend the presence of excuses in the system of liability 
principles. 
The unacceptability of assigning liability when the results of conduct do not reflect 
rational calculations has been argued before, but rather differently from how I have here.56 
My concern is not to argue against strict liability for agents who are not rational, who do not 
fit the economist's model at all or very often. Rather my concern is to point out that even 
for the most rational of us, there are always aspects of our conduct that do not reflect our 
preferences or any other salient facts about us. Because this is true, the mere fact that a 
defendant's conduct is causally implicated in the occurrence of the plaintiff's injuries is not 
enough to establish that the defendant caused those injuries. So if liability is to depend on 
showing that the defendant has caused the plaintiff's injuries, then it will not be enough to 
require that the defendant's conduct, considered only as outward behavior, conform to some 
pattern. Indeed, as I have argued, something akin to, if not identical with, the reasonable 
man standard and the system of excuses of the negligence system will be required. Thus, as I 
concluded in assessing Calabresi's approach, the economies. of judicial decision procedure that 
are to be bought through adopting strict liability are an illusion. 
These criticisms of Epstein's approach to causation are confirmed by the fact that an 
agent's doing something which fits one of Epstein's paradigms does not guarantee that the 
agent caused the ensuing injuries any more than having the status of cheapest cost-avoider 
does. John Borgo, arguing quite rightly that Epstein's account of "human causal agency" is 
inadequate because it "focuses on conduct isolated from context,,,57 produces cases in which 
the paradigm of fright is satisfied, but the defendant has not caused the fright. These cases 
are all variations on a peculiar situation involving grossly abnormal susceptibility to fright, 
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however, a fact which muddies the waters unnecessarily, since counterexamples to the 
paradigms of force and creation of dangerous conditions are easily produced. The mountain 
climber who falls through the snow covering a hidden fissure into which a skier has already 
fallen, for instance, and in falling strikes that skier in a way that inflicts injuries, fits the 
paradigm of force, but has not caused the injuries. The injuries are explained by the 
climber's falling on the skier, but the falling is in turn explained not so much by facts about 
the climber as by facts about the landscape. 
Moreover, it is easily shown that the "act" requirement does not even explain why no 
liability is assigned in the very case Epstein uses in defending the need for the requirement. 
In Smith v. Stone58 no recovery in trespass was allowed because the defendant had come to 
be on plaintiff's land unwillingly, through having been carried onto it by a band of armed 
men. That the "act requirement" does not account for this decision is shown by the fact that 
parallel cases may be constructed in which damages might well be awarded. When hurricanes 
threaten, for instance, common standards of care demand that moveable objects be secured or 
brought inside, lest they become dangerous projectiles in the wind. A person foolishly 
caught by the winds and thrown through a neighbor's sliding glass door satisfies the "act 
requirement" no more nor less than Stone did, for all we are told, yet has caused damage to 
the door through negligent creation of a dangerous condition (or application of force, 
alternatively). It is negligence or lack of it that must be cited as the decisive difference 
between the two cases, since in both the defendant is, at the time of entering plaintiff's 
property, no more than unwilling baggage carried along by superior force. 
In conclusion, I should say that although the proposals reviewed here do not deliver what 
they promise in the way of simplifying and regimenting judicial decision in torts, it is 
nevertheless reasonable to adopt the strategy that Epstein, following Hart and Honore, does, 
of attempting to enhance the role of factual determinations of causation. Similarly it is 
reasonable to aim as both Epstein and Calabresi do, for reforms that will ensure fair warning 
of what one's duties will be held by courts to be, although the line of argument I have 
pressed would commend not a scheme for ranking cheap cost-avoiders, but, unless a better 
substitute can be found, a full return to the notion of a single universal duty of care with 
respect to foreseeable harm. This would be highly preferable to a situation in which 
determinations of the extent of duties are often made only as a result of, and in the course 
of, litigation. 
I should also again emphasize that although concerns about certainty or predictability of 
outcomes in torts have usually revolved around issues of minimizing the costs of litigation 
and giving tort theory predictive power (this being construed as an index of how scientifically 
respectable its explanations of decisions are59), my concern here has been with predictability 
insofar as fair warning plays a role in justifying the imposition of liability. But since 
reformulations of tort doctrine have rarely enjoyed the status of purely detached theories that 
could be true to their subject without recreating it, there is a perpetual interplay between the 
vicissitudes of theoretical predictive power and the ability of ordinary people to determine 
the status of their conduct under the law. In the end it is a vexing irony that no progress 
can be made without reforms, but, at the same time, so long as reforms are proposed and 
gain less than universal acceptance, a state of confusion will reign that is more troublesome 
than what we would experience were no reforms being attempted. 
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